Trying to validate external reference identifiers with SecTrustEvaluateWithError Method by setting reference Ids to SecPolicyCreateSSL() & SecPolicyCreateWithProperties()
But two concerns are -
Validates for correct reference IDs but gives error for combination of wrong & correct reference Ids
398 days validity works mandatorily before reference Ids check.
Is there any other to validate external reference Ids?, which give flexibility
To pass multiple combinations of reference IDs string (wrong, correct, IP, DNS)
To validate reference ID without days validity of 398.
Please suggest. Any help here is highly appreciated.
Prioritize user privacy and data security in your app. Discuss best practices for data handling, user consent, and security measures to protect user information.
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Dear Apple Developer Technical Support,
We are currently following the official Apple documentation “TN3159: Migrating Sign in with Apple users for an app transfer” to carry out a Sign in with Apple user migration after successfully transferring several apps to a new developer account.
Here is a summary of our situation:
Under the original Apple developer account, we had five apps using Sign in with Apple, grouped under a shared primary app using App Grouping.
Recently, we transferred three of these apps to our new Apple developer account via App Store Connect.
After the transfer, these three apps are no longer associated with the original primary App ID. We reconfigured individual Services IDs for each app in the new account and enabled Sign in with Apple for each.
More than 24 hours have passed since the app transfer was completed.
Now we are attempting to follow the migration process to restore user access via the user.migration flow. Specifically, we are using the following script to request an Apple access token:
url = "https://appleid.apple.com/auth/token"
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"}
data = {
"grant_type": "client_credentials",
"scope": "user.migration",
"client_id": "com.game.friends.ios.toptop.sea", # New Services ID in the new account
"client_secret": "<JWT signed with new p8 key>"
}
response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, data=data)
However, the API response consistently returns:
{
"error": "invalid_client"
}
We have verified that the following configurations are correct:
The client_secret is generated using the p8 key from the new account, signed with ES256 and correct key_id, team_id, and client_id.
The client_id corresponds to the Services ID created in the new account and properly associated with the migrated app.
The scope is set to user.migration.
The JWT payload contains correct iss, sub, and aud values as per Apple documentation.
The app has been fully transferred and reconfigured more than 24 hours ago.
Problem Summary & Request for Support:
According to Apple’s official documentation:
“After an app is transferred, Apple updates the Sign in with Apple configuration in the background. This can take up to 24 hours. During this time, attempts to authenticate users or validate tokens may fail.”
However, we are still consistently receiving invalid_client errors after the 24-hour waiting period. We suspect one of the following issues:
The transferred apps may still be partially associated with the original App Grouping or primary App ID.
Some Sign in with Apple configuration in Apple’s backend may not have been fully updated after the transfer.
Or the Services ID is not yet fully operational for the transferred apps in the new account.
We kindly request your assistance to:
Verify whether the transferred apps have been completely detached from the original App Grouping and primary App ID.
Confirm whether the new Services IDs under the new account are fully functional and eligible for Sign in with Apple with user.migration scope.
Help identify any remaining configuration or migration issues that may cause the invalid_client error.
If necessary, assist in manually ungrouping or clearing any residual App Grouping relationships affecting the new environment.
We have also generated and retained the original transfer_sub identifiers and are fully prepared to complete the sub mapping once the user.migration flow becomes functional.
Thank you very much for your time and support!
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
Sign in with Apple
Tags:
Sign in with Apple REST API
Sign in with Apple
Has anyone here encountered this? It's driving me crazy.
It appears on launch.
App Sandbox is enabled.
The proper entitlement is selected (com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-write)
I believe this is causing an issue with app functionality for users on different machines.
There is zero documentation across the internet on this problem.
I am on macOS 26 beta. This error appears in both Xcode and Xcode-beta.
Please help!
Thank you,
Logan
"I am attempting to read and write data to an Office Group Container, and I am consistently prompted with the "App would like to access data from other apps" alert. How can I configure the application or environment to suppress this repeated permission prompt?"
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
I am developing a daemon-based product that needs a cryptographic, non-spoofable proof of machine identity so a remote management server can grant permissions based on the physical machine.
I was thinking to create a signing key in the Secure Enclave and use a certificate signed by that key as the machine identity. The problem is that the Secure Enclave key I can create is only accessible from user context, while my product runs as a system daemon and must not rely on user processes or launchAgents.
Could you please advise on the recommended Apple-supported approaches for this use case ?
Specifically, Is there a supported way for a system daemon to generate and use an unremovable Secure Enclave key during phases like the pre-logon, that doesn't have non user context (only the my application which created this key/certificate will have permission to use/delete it)
If Secure Enclave access from a daemon is not supported, what Apple-recommended alternatives exist for providing a hardware-backed machine identity for system daemons?
I'd rather avoid using system keychain, as its contents may be removed or used by root privileged users.
The ideal solution would be that each Apple product, would come out with a non removable signing certificate, that represent the machine itself (lets say that the cetificate name use to represent the machine ID), and can be validated by verify that the root signer is "Apple Root CA"
Hello,
I'm an application developer related to Apple system extensions. I developed an endpoint security system extension that can run normally before the 14.x system. However, after I upgraded to 15.x, I found that when I uninstalled and reinstalled my system extension, although the system extension was installed successfully, a system warning box would pop up when I clicked enable in the Settings, indicating a failure.
I conducted the following test. I reinstalled a brand-new MAC 15.x system. When I installed my applications, the system extensions could be installed successfully and enabled normally. However, when I uninstalled and reinstalled, my system extension couldn't be enabled properly and a system warning popped up as well. I tried disabling SIP and enabling System Extension Developers, but it still didn't work.
When the system warning box pops up, I can see some error log information through the console application, including an error related to
Failed to authorize right 'com.apple.system-extensions.admin' by client '/System/Library/ExtensionKit/Extensions/SettingsSystemExtensionController.appex' [2256] for authorization created by '/System/Library/ExtensionKit/Extensions/SettingsSystemExtensionController.appex' [2256] (3,0) (-60005) (engine 179)
as shown in the screenshot.
The same problem, mentioned in Cannot approve some extensions in MacOS Sequoia , but there is no solution
Hi,
how can you authenticate a User through Biometrics with iPhone Passcode as Fallback in the Autofill Credential Provider Extension?
In the App it works without a problem. In the Extension I get
"Caller is not running foreground"
Yeah, it isn't, as it's just a sheet above e.g. Safari.
I'd like to avoid having the user setup a Passcode dedicated to my App, especially because FaceID is way faster.
Does anybody know how to achieve iOS native Auth in the extension?
Please let me know, a code sample would be appreciated.
Regards,
Mia
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Tags:
Face ID
Touch ID
Local Authentication
Authentication Services
I have a small command-line app I've been using for years to process files. I have it run by an Automator script, so that I can drop files onto it. It stopped working this morning.
At first, I could still run the app from the command line, without Automator. But then after I recompiled the app, now I cannot even do that. When I run it, it's saying 'zsh: killed' followed by my app's path. What is that?
The app does run if I run it from Xcode.
How do I fix this?
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Hi,
I am using CryptoKit in my app. I am getting an error sometimes with some users. I log the description to Firebase but I am not sure what is it exactly about.
CryptoKit.CryptoKitError error 2
CryptoKit.CryptoKitError error 3
I receive both of these errors. I also save debug prints to a log file and let users share them with me. Logs are line-by-line encrypted but after getting these errors in the app also decryption of log files doesn't work and it throws these errors too.
I couldn't reproduce the same error by myself, and I can't reach the user's logs so I am a little blind about what triggers this.
It would be helpful to understand what these errors mean.
Thanks
Hi,
I develop a Mac application, initially on Catalina/Xcode12, but I recently upgrade to Monterey/Xcode13. I'm about to publish a new version: on Monterey all works as expected, but when I try the app on Sequoia, as a last step before uploading to the App Store, I encountered some weird security issues:
The main symptom is that it's no longer possible to save any file from the app using the Save panel, although the User Select File entitlement is set to Read/Write.
I've tried reinstalling different versions of the app, including the most recent downloaded from TestFlight. But, whatever the version, any try to save using the panel (e.g. on the desktop) results in a warning telling that I don't have authorization to record the file to that folder.
Moreover, when I type spctl -a -t exec -v /Applications/***.app in the terminal, it returns rejected, even when the application has been installed by TestFlight.
An EtreCheck report tells that my app is not signed, while codesign -dv /Applications/***.app returns a valid signature. I'm lost...
It suspect a Gate Keeper problem, but I cannot found any info on the web about how this system could be reset. I tried sudo spctl --reset-default, but it returns This operation is no longer supported...
I wonder if these symptoms depend on how the app is archived and could be propagated to my final users, or just related to a corrupted install of Sequoia on my local machine. My feeling is that a signature problem should have been detected by the archive validation, but how could we be sure?
Any idea would be greatly appreciated, thanks!
Hi everyone,
I'm working on an app that stores multiple secrets in the Keychain, each protected with .userPresence.
My goal is to authenticate the user once via FaceID/TouchID and then read multiple Keychain items without triggering subsequent prompts.
I am reusing the same LAContext instance for these operations, and I have set:
context.touchIDAuthenticationAllowableReuseDuration = LATouchIDAuthenticationMaximumAllowableReuseDuration
However, I'm observing that every single SecItemCopyMatching call triggers a new FaceID/TouchID prompt, even if they happen within seconds of each other using the exact same context.
Here is a simplified flow of what I'm doing:
Create a LAContext.
Set touchIDAuthenticationAllowableReuseDuration to max.
Perform a query (SecItemCopyMatching) for Item A, passing [kSecUseAuthenticationContext: context].
Result: System prompts for FaceID. Success.
Immediately perform a query (SecItemCopyMatching) for Item B, passing the same [kSecUseAuthenticationContext: context].
Result: System prompts for FaceID again.
My question is:
Does the .userPresence access control flag inherently force a new user interaction for every Keychain access, regardless of the LAContext reuse duration? Is allowableReuseDuration only applicable for LAContext.evaluatePolicy calls and not for SecItem queries?
If so, is there a recommended pattern for "unlocking" a group of Keychain items with a single biometric prompt?
Environment: iOS 17+, Swift.
Thanks!
Hi
https://appleid.apple.com/auth/authorize?client_id=com.adobe.services.adobeid-na1.web
shows:
invalid_request
But https://appleid.apple.com/auth/authorize?client_id=xrqxnpjgps
shows:
invalid_client
I've created a Primary App ID and ticked "Sign In with Apple".
I've created a Service ID and ticked "Sign In with Apple" (identifier is xrqxnpjgps).
When I click "Configure" for the "Sign In with Apple" of the Service ID, it is linked to the Primary App ID.
Why do I get an invalid_client error?
I've contacted the support by mail, and have been redirected here, does someone here have the ability/access/knowledge/will to figure out the cause and then tell me?
Regards
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
Sign in with Apple
I am writing a MacOS app that uses the Apple crypto libraries to create, save, and use an RSA key pair. I am not using a Secure Enclave so that the private key can later the retrieved through the keychain. The problem I am running into is that on my and multiple other systems the creation and retrieval works fine. On a different system -- running MacOS 15.3 just like the working systems -- the SecKeyCreateRandomKey function appears to work fine and I get a key reference back, but on subsequent runs SecItemCopyMatching results in errSecItemNotFound. Why would it appear to save properly on some systems and not others?
var error: Unmanaged<CFError>?
let access = SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags(kCFAllocatorDefault,
kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly,
.biometryAny,
&error)!
let tag = TAG.data(using: .utf8)! // com.example.myapp.rsakey
let attributes: [String: Any] = [
kSecAttrKeyType as String: KEY_TYPE, // set to kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA
kSecAttrKeySizeInBits as String: 3072,
kSecPrivateKeyAttrs as String: [
kSecAttrIsPermanent as String: true,
kSecAttrApplicationTag as String: tag,
kSecAttrAccessControl as String: access,
],
]
guard let newKey = SecKeyCreateRandomKey(attributes as CFDictionary, &error) else {
throw error!.takeRetainedValue() as Error
}
return newKey
This runs fine on both systems, getting a valid key reference that I can use. But then if I immediately try to pull the key, it works on my system but not the other.
let query = [ kSecClass as String: kSecClassKey,
kSecAttrApplicationTag as String: tag,
kSecReturnRef as String: true, ]
var item: CFTypeRef?
let status = SecItemCopyMatching(query as CFDictionary, &item)
let msg = SecCopyErrorMessageString(status, nil)
if status == errSecItemNotFound {
print("key not found")
}
guard status == errSecSuccess else { print("other retrieval error") }
return item as! SecKey
I've also tried a separate query using the secCall function from here (https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/710961) that gets ALL kSecClassKey items before and after the "create the key" function and it'll report the same amount of keys before and after on the bugged system. On the other machines where it works, it'll show one more key as expected.
In the Signing & Capabilities section of the project config, I have Keychain Sharing set up with a group like com.example.myapp where my key uses a tag like com.example.myapp.rsakey. The entitlements file has an associated entry for Keychain Access Groups with value $(AppIdentifierPrefix)com.example.myapp.
I am using the CryptoKit SecureEnclave enum to generate Secure Enclave keys. I've got a couple of questions:
What is the lifetime of these keys?
When I don't store them somewhere, how does the Secure Enclave know they are gone? Do backups impact these keys? I.e. can I lose access to the key when I restore a backup?
Do these keys count to the total storage capacity of the Secure Enclave?
If I recall correctly, the Secure Enclave has a limited storage capacity. Do the SecureEnclave key instances count towards this storage capacity?
What is the dataRepresentation and how can I use this?
I'd like to store the Secure Enclave (preferably not in the Keychain due to its limitations). Is it "okay" to store this elsewhere, for instance in a file or in the UserDefaults?
Can the dataRepresentation be used in other apps?
If I had the capability of extracting the dataRepresentation as an attacker, could I then rebuild that key in my malicious app, as the key can be rebuilt with the Secure Enclave on the same device, or are there measures in place to prevent this (sandbox, bundle id, etc.)
Hello,
I’m storing some values in the Keychain with the attribute ‘ksecattraccessibleafterfirstunlockthisdeviceonly’ (https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/ksecattraccessibleafterfirstunlockthisdeviceonly).
When I migrate user data between iPhones via iCloud, this behaves as expected and the keys are not preserved.
However, when I migrate using a direct connection between two devices, the keys are preserved, which seems to contradict the attribute’s intent.
Is this a known behavior, and if so, is there a workaround?
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
I recently turned on the enhanced security options for my macOS app in Xcode 26.0.1 by adding the Enhanced Security capability in the Signing and Capabilities tab. Then, Xcode adds the following key-value sets (with some other key-values) to my app's entitlements file.
<key>com.apple.security.hardened-process.enhanced-security-version</key>
<integer>1</integer>
<key>com.apple.security.hardened-process.platform-restrictions</key>
<integer>2</integer>
These values appear following the documentation about the enhanced security feature (Enabling enhanced security for your app) and the app works without any issues.
However, when I submitted a new version to the Mac App Store, my submission was rejected, and I received the following message from the App Review team via the App Store Connect.
Guideline 2.4.5(i) - Performance
Your app incorrectly implements sandboxing, or it contains one or more entitlements with invalid values. Please review the included entitlements and sandboxing documentation and resolve this issue before resubmitting a new binary.
Entitlement "com.apple.security.hardened-process.enhanced-security-version" value must be boolean and true.
Entitlement "com.apple.security.hardened-process.platform-restrictions" value must be boolean and true.
When I changed those values directly in the entitlements file based on this message, the app appears to still work. However, these settings are against the description in the documentation I mentioned above and against the settings Xcode inserted after changing the GUI setting view.
So, my question is, which settings are actually correct to enable the Enhanced Security and the Additional Runtime Platform Restrictions?
I'm seeing some odd behavior which may be a bug. I've broken it down to a least common denominator to reproduce it. But maybe I'm doing something wrong.
I am opening a file read-write. I'm then mapping the file read-only and private:
void* pointer = mmap(NULL, 17, PROT_READ, MAP_FILE | MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
I then unmap the memory and close the file. After the close, eslogger shows me this:
{"close":{"modified":false,[...],"was_mapped_writable":false}}
Which makes sense.
I then change the mmap statement to:
void* pointer = mmap(NULL, 17, PROT_READ, MAP_FILE | MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
I run the new code and and the close looks like:
{"close":{"modified":false, [....], "was_mapped_writable":true}}
Which also makes sense.
I then run the original again (ie, with MAP_PRIVATE vs. MAP_SHARED) and the close looks like:
{"close":{"modified":false,"was_mapped_writable":true,[...]}
Which doesn't appear to be correct.
Now if I just open and close the file (again, read-write) and don't mmap anything the close still shows:
{"close":{ [...], "was_mapped_writable":true,"modified":false}}
And the same is true if I open the file read-only.
It will remain that way until I delete the file. If I recreate the file and try again, everything is good until I map it MAP_SHARED.
I tried this with macOS 13.6.7 and macOS 15.0.1.
Hi Apple team,
For our iPhone app (App Store build), a small subset of devices report DCAppAttestService.isSupported == false, preventing App Attest from being enabled.
Approx. impact: 0.23% (352/153,791)
iOS observed: Broadly 15.x–18.7 (also saw a few anomalous entries ios/26.0, likely client logging noise)
Device models: Multiple generations (iPhone8–iPhone17); a few iPad7 entries present although the app targets iPhone
Questions
In iPhone main app context, what conditions can make isSupported return false on iOS 14+?
Are there known device/iOS cases where temporary false can occur (SEP/TrustChain related)? Any recommended remediation (e.g., DFU restore)?
Could you share logging guidance (Console.app subsystem/keywords) to investigate such cases?
What fallback policy do you recommend when isSupported == false (e.g., SE-backed signature + DeviceCheck + risk rules), and any limitations?
We can provide sysdiagnose/Console logs and more case details upon request.
Thank you,
—
Hi Team,
We are trying to understand deep sleep behaviour, can you please help us clarifying on the below questions:
When will we configure Hibernate 25, is it valid for M series MacBooks?
Is Hibernate 25 called deep sleep mode?
What are the settings I need to do on Mac, to make my Mac go in to deep sleep?
When awakening from deep sleep , what would be macOS system behaviour?
If we have custom SFAuthorization plug in at system.login.screensaver, what would be the behaviour with deep sleep?
There’s a critical, actively exploited vulnerability in Apple’s iOS activation servers allowing unauthenticated XML payload injection:
https://cyberpress.org/apple-ios-activation-vulnerability/
This flaw targets the core activation process, bypassing normal security checks. Despite the severity, it’s barely discussed in public security channels.
Why is this not being addressed or publicly acknowledged? Apple developers and security researchers should urgently review and audit activation flows—this is a direct attack vector on device trust integrity.
Any insights or official response appreciated.