We are experiencing a significant issue with macOS security alerts that began on July 9th, at approximately 4:40 AM UTC. This alert is incorrectly identifying output files from our snippet tests as malware, causing these files to be blocked and moved to the Trash. This is completely disrupting our automated testing workflows.
Issue Description:
Alert: We are seeing the "Malware Blocked and Moved to Trash" popup window.
Affected Files: The security alert triggers when attempting to execute .par files generated as outputs from our snippet tests. These .par files are unique to each individual test run; they are not a single, static tool.
System-Wide Impact: This issue is impacting multiple macOS hosts across our testing infrastructure.
Timeline: The issue began abruptly on July 9th, at approximately 4:40 AM UTC. Before that time, our tests were functioning correctly.
macOS Versions: The problem is occurring on hosts running both macOS 14.x and 15.x.
Experimental Host: Even after upgrading an experimental host to macOS 15.6 beta 2, the issue persisted.
Local execution: The issue can be reproduced locally.
Observations:
The security system is consistently flagging these snippet test output files as malware.
Since each test generates a new .par file, and this issue is impacting all generated files, the root cause doesn't appear to be specific to the code within the .par files themselves.
This issue is impacting all the snippet tests, making us believe that the root cause is not related to our code.
The sudden and widespread nature of the issue strongly suggests a change in a security database or rule, rather than a change in our testing code.
Questions:
Could a recent update to the XProtect database be the cause of this false positive?
Are there any known issues or recent changes in macOS security mechanisms that could cause this kind of widespread and sudden impact?
What is the recommended way to diagnose and resolve this kind of false positive?
We appreciate any guidance or assistance you can provide. Thank you.
General
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First, I do not publish my application to the AppStore, but I need to customize a sandbox environment. It seems that sandbox-exec cannot configure entitlements, so I have used some other APIs, such as sandbox_compile_entitlements and sandbox_apply_container. When encountering the entitlement "com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-only", I am unsure how to correctly write sandbox profile to implement this. Can anyone help me?
Hello,
I have encountered several challenges related to System Integrity Protection (SIP) state detection and code signing requirements. I would like to seek clarification and guidance on the proper approach to programmatically determine the SIP state.
Here are the issues I’ve encountered:
XPC Code Signing Check APIs:
APIs like setCodeSigningRequirement and setConnectionCodeSigningRequirement do not work when SIP disabled and that's ok given what SIP is.
LaunchCodeRequirement API:
When using Process.launchRequirement, the LaunchCodeRequirement API does not function anymore when SIP disabled.
The IsSIPProtected requirement behaves in a way that is not clearly documented -- it appears to only apply to pre-installed Apple apps.
Legacy APIs:
Older APIs like SecCodeCheckValidity are likely to be non-functional, though I haven’t had the chance to validate this yet.
Private API Concerns:
So to mitigate those limitations I prefer my app to not even try to connect to untrusted XPC or launch untrusted Processes when SIP is disabled. The only way to determine SIP state I could find is a low-level C function csr_get_active_config. However, this function is not declared in any publicly available header file, indicating that it is a private API.
Since private APIs cannot be used in App Store-distributed apps and are best avoided for Developer ID-signed apps, this does not seem like a viable solution.
Given these limitations, what is the recommended and proper approach to programmatically determine the SIP state in a macOS application?
Any insights or guidance would be greatly appreciated.
Thank you!
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
In one of my apps I would like to find out if users have their device set up to authenticate with their Apple Watch.
According to the documentation (https://developer.apple.com/documentation/localauthentication/lapolicy/deviceownerauthenticationwithcompanion) this would be done by evaluating the LAPolicy like this:
var error: NSError?
var canEvaluateCompanion = false
if #available(iOS 18.0, *) {
canEvaluateCompanion = context.canEvaluatePolicy(.deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithCompanion, error: &error)
}
But when I run this on my iPhone 16 Pro (iOS 18.5) with a paired Apple Watch SE 2nd Gen (watchOS 11.5) it always returns false and the error is -1000 "No companion device available". But authentication with my watch is definitely enabled, because I regularly unlock my phone with the watch.
Other evaluations of using biometrics just works as expected.
Anything that I am missing?
Hi,
I have a certificate, how can I display the certificate content in my Mac app just like Keychain Access app does. Can I popup the certificate content dialog just like Keychain Access app?
I requested permission to use the Family Controls entitlement two weeks ago, and I have not received a response or status update. I have been to that page where it says "Thank you! We'll get back to you soon!" so many times.
Hello, I am currently researching to develop an application where I want to apply the MacOS updates without the password prompt shown to the users.
I did some research on this and understand that an MDM solution can apply these patches without user intervention.
Are there any other ways we can achieve this? Any leads are much appreciated.
Hi,
I’d like to confirm something regarding the hosting of the apple-app-site-association (AASA) file.
We have a server that publicly hosts the AASA file and is accessible globally. However, this server sits behind an additional security layer (a security server/reverse proxy).
My question is:
Will this security layer affect Apple’s ability to access and validate the AASA file for Universal Links or App Clips?
Are there specific requirements (e.g. headers, redirects, TLS versions, etc.) that we need to ensure the security server does not block or modify?
Any guidance or best practices would be appreciated.
I was basically saving items into the Keychain with the following query dictionary:
let query: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrAccount as String: key,
kSecValueData as String: value,
kSecAttrAccessible as String: kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock
]
Where key is a String value and value is a Data that used to be a String.
I was getting the following error:
code: -25299
description: The specified item already exists in the keychain
After a lot of digging in I saw that I needed to add kSecAttrService to the dictionary and after that it all started working. The service value is a String value.
let query: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: service,
kSecAttrAccount as String: key,
kSecValueData as String: value,
kSecAttrAccessible as String: kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock
]
These were the articles that suggested adding the kSecAttrService parameter:
https://stackoverflow.com/a/11672200
https://stackoverflow.com/a/58233542
But in the same code base I found that other developers were saving using a dictionary similar to the one I first provided and it works:
var query: [String : Any] = [
kSecClass as String : kSecClassGenericPassword as String,
kSecAttrAccount as String : key,
kSecValueData as String : data
]
I don't know how to explain why my first implementation didn't work even though it was similar to what was already in the code base but the second approach worked well.
Regardless of the query dictionary, this is how I'm saving things:
static func save(value: Data, key: String, service: String) -> KeyChainOperationStatus {
logInfo("Save Value - started, key: \(key), service: \(service)")
let query: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: service,
kSecAttrAccount as String: key,
kSecValueData as String: value,
kSecAttrAccessible as String: kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock
]
// Remove any existing key
let cleanUpStatus = SecItemDelete(query as CFDictionary)
let cleanUpStatusDescription = SecCopyErrorMessageString(cleanUpStatus, nil)?.asString ?? "__cleanup_status_unavailable"
logInfo("Save Value - cleanup status: \(cleanUpStatus), description: \(cleanUpStatusDescription)")
guard cleanUpStatus == errSecSuccess || cleanUpStatus == errSecItemNotFound else {
logError("Save Value - Failed cleaning up KeyChain")
return .cleanupFailed(code: cleanUpStatus)
}
// Add the new key
let saveStatus = SecItemAdd(query as CFDictionary, nil)
let saveStatusDescription = SecCopyErrorMessageString(saveStatus, nil)?.asString ?? "__save_status_unavailable"
logInfo("Save Value - save status [\(saveStatus)] : \(saveStatusDescription)")
guard saveStatus == errSecSuccess else {
logError("Save Value - Failed saving new value into KeyChain")
return .savingFailed(code: saveStatus)
}
return .successs
}
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
I am using the CryptoKit SecureEnclave enum to generate Secure Enclave keys. I've got a couple of questions:
What is the lifetime of these keys?
When I don't store them somewhere, how does the Secure Enclave know they are gone? Do backups impact these keys? I.e. can I lose access to the key when I restore a backup?
Do these keys count to the total storage capacity of the Secure Enclave?
If I recall correctly, the Secure Enclave has a limited storage capacity. Do the SecureEnclave key instances count towards this storage capacity?
What is the dataRepresentation and how can I use this?
I'd like to store the Secure Enclave (preferably not in the Keychain due to its limitations). Is it "okay" to store this elsewhere, for instance in a file or in the UserDefaults?
Can the dataRepresentation be used in other apps?
If I had the capability of extracting the dataRepresentation as an attacker, could I then rebuild that key in my malicious app, as the key can be rebuilt with the Secure Enclave on the same device, or are there measures in place to prevent this (sandbox, bundle id, etc.)
Our desktop app for macos will be released in 2 channels
appstore
dmg package on our official website for users to download and install
Now when we debug with passkey, we find that the package name of the appstore can normally arouse passkey, but the package name of the non-App Store can not arouse the passkey interface
I need your help. Thank you
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Tags:
Bundle ID
macOS
Passkeys in iCloud Keychain
Authentication Services
Using the SDK, I've printed out some log messages when I enter the wrong password:
2025-08-20 15:58:14.086 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] invoke
2025-08-20 15:58:14.086 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] general:
2025-08-20 15:58:14.086 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] progname: 'SecurityAgentHelper-arm64'
2025-08-20 15:58:14.086 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] OS version: 'Version 15.5 (Build 24F74)'
2025-08-20 15:58:14.086 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] pid: '818'
2025-08-20 15:58:14.086 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] ppid: '1'
2025-08-20 15:58:14.086 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] euid: '92'
2025-08-20 15:58:14.086 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] uid: '92'
2025-08-20 15:58:14.087 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] session: 0x186e9
2025-08-20 15:58:14.087 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] attributes:
2025-08-20 15:58:14.087 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] is root: f
2025-08-20 15:58:14.087 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] has graphics: t
2025-08-20 15:58:14.087 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] has TTY: t
2025-08-20 15:58:14.087 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] is remote: f
2025-08-20 15:58:14.087 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] auth session: 0x0
2025-08-20 15:58:14.087 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] context:
2025-08-20 15:58:14.088 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] authentication-failure: --S -14090
2025-08-20 15:58:14.088 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] pam_result: X-S 9
2025-08-20 15:58:14.089 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] hints:
2025-08-20 15:58:14.089 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] authorize-right: "system.login.console"
2025-08-20 15:58:14.090 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] client-path: "/System/Library/CoreServices/loginwindow.app"
2025-08-20 15:58:14.090 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] client-pid: 807
2025-08-20 15:58:14.090 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] client-type: 'LDNB'
2025-08-20 15:58:14.090 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] client-uid: 0
2025-08-20 15:58:14.090 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] creator-audit-token:
2025-08-20 15:58:14.090 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
2025-08-20 15:58:14.090 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] 00 00 00 00 27 03 00 00 e9 86 01 00 68 08 00 00 ....'.......h...
2025-08-20 15:58:14.090 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] creator-pid: 807
2025-08-20 15:58:14.090 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] flags: 259
2025-08-20 15:58:14.090 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] reason: 0
2025-08-20 15:58:14.090 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] tries: 1
2025-08-20 15:58:14.090 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] immutable hints:
2025-08-20 15:58:14.090 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] client-apple-signed: true
2025-08-20 15:58:14.090 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] client-firstparty-signed: true
2025-08-20 15:58:14.090 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] creator-apple-signed: true
2025-08-20 15:58:14.090 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] creator-firstparty-signed: true
2025-08-20 15:58:14.091 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] arguments:
2025-08-20 15:58:14.091 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] none
2025-08-20 15:58:14.108 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] LAContext: LAContext[4:8:112]
2025-08-20 15:58:14.119 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] token identities: 0
2025-08-20 15:58:14.120 Db SecurityAgentHelper-arm64[818:1efd] [com.example.apple-samplecode.LoggingAuthPlugin:mechanism] token watcher: <TKTokenWatcher: 0x11410ee70>
Specifically, is there a manual/link somewhere that can allow me to interpret:
authentication-failure: --S -14090
and
pam_result: X-S 9
Hi Team,
How can we fetch the macOS password requirement(for setting a new password) that are inforce during login for users? Is there a way to get this info in swift programming?
Using the simplified sign-in with tvOS and a third party password manager, I receive a complete ASPasswordCredential, and I can easily log into my app. When I do the same thing but with Apple's password manager as the source, I receive an ASPasswordCredential that includes the email address, but the password is an empty string.
I have tried deleting the credentials from Apple Passwords and regenerating them with a new login to the app's website. I have tried restarting my iPhone.
Is this the expected behavior? How should I be getting a password from Apple's Password app with an ASAuthorizationPasswordRequest?
For context, my company develops a data loss prevention (DLP) product. Part of our functionality is the ability to detect sensitive data being pasted into a web browser or cloud-based app.
The AppKit release notes for April 2025 document an upcoming “macOS pasteboard privacy” feature, which will presumably ship in macOS 26. Using the user default setting “EnablePasteboardPrivacyDeveloperPreview” documented in the release notes, I tested our agent under macOS 15.5, and encountered a modal alert reading " is trying to access the pasteboard" almost immediately, when the program reads the General pasteboard to scan its contents.
Since our product is aimed at enterprise customers (and not individual Mac users), I believed Apple would implement a privacy control setting for this new feature. This would allow our customers to push a configuration profile via MDM, with the “Paste from Other Apps” setting for our application preset to “Allow”, so that they can install our product on their endpoints without manual intervention.
Unfortunately, as of macOS 26 beta 4 (25A5316i), there does not seem to be any such setting documented under Device Management — for example in PrivacyPreferencesPolicyControl.Services, which lists a number of similar settings. Without such a setting available, a valuable function of our product will be effectively crippled when macOS 26 is released.
Is there such a setting (that I've overlooked)? If not, allow me to urge Apple to find the resources to implement one, so that our customers can preset “Paste from Other Apps” to “Allow” for our application.
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Tags:
Privacy
AppKit
Endpoint Security
Device Management
I am new to swift development, and it's possible that I'm missing something fundamental/obvious. If so, I apologize in advance. My team is developing an application for iPadOS using SwiftUI, and I'm trying to accomplish something similar to what the original inquirer is asking for in this thread: https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/725152. The only difference is that I'm trying to use a PIV smart card to achieve authentication to a server rather than digitally sign a document.
Unfortunately, I'm getting stuck when attempting to run the list() function provided in the accepted answer to the post mentioned above. When attempting to call SecItemCopyMatching(), I'm getting a -34018 missing entitlement error. I've attempted to add the com.apple.token to my app's keychain-access-groups entitlements, but this does not resolve the issue. I have checked the entitlements in my built app, per the recommendation in the troubleshooting guide here: https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/114456. The entitlement for com.apple.token is indeed present in the plist. Based on other documentation I've read, however, it seems that the explicit declaration of com.apple.token should not even be required in the entitlements.
Is there something obvious that I'm missing here that would prevent my app from accessing the token access group?
I’d like to confirm something regarding the hosting of the apple-app-site-association (AASA) file.
We have a server that publicly hosts the AASA file and is accessible globally. However, this server sits behind an additional security layer (a security server/reverse proxy).
My question is:
Will this security layer affect Apple’s ability to access and validate the AASA file for Universal Links or App Clips?
Are there specific requirements (e.g. headers, redirects, TLS versions, etc.) that we need to ensure the security server does not block or modify?
Any guidance or best practices would be appreciated.
Thanks!
Problem Description:
In our App, When we launch the web login part using ASWebAuthentication + Universal Links with callback scheme as "https", we are not receiving callback.
Note:
We are using "SwiftUIWebAuthentication" Swift Package Manager to display page in ASWebAuth.
But when we use custom url scheme instead of Universal link, app able to receive call back every time.
We use ".onOpenURL" to receive universal link callback scheme.
Quinn, you've often suggested that to validate the other side of an XPC connection, we should use the audit token. But that's not available from the XPC object, whereas the PID is. So everyone uses the PID.
While looking for something completely unrelated, I found this in the SecCode.h file
OSStatus SecCodeCreateWithXPCMessage(xpc_object_t message, SecCSFlags flags,
SecCodeRef * __nonnull CF_RETURNS_RETAINED target);
Would this be the preferred way to do this now? At least from 11.0 and up.
Like I said, I was looking for something completely unrelated and found this and don't have the cycles right now to try it. But it looks promising from the description and I wanted to check in with you about it in case you can say yes or no before I get a chance to test it.
Thanks
Hello!
I do know apple does not support electron, but I do not think this is an electron related issue, rather something I am doing wrong. I'd be curious to find out why the keychain login is happenning after my app has been signed with the bundleid, entitlements, and provision profile.
Before using the provision profile I did not have this issue, but it is needed for assessments feature.
I'm trying to ship an Electron / macOS desktop app that must run inside Automatic Assessment Configuration. The build signs and notarizes successfully, and assessment mode itself starts on Apple-arm64 machines, but every single launch shows the system dialog that asks to allow access to the "login" keychain. The dialog appears on totally fresh user accounts, so it's not tied to anything I store there.
It has happened ever since I have added the provision profile to the electron builder to finally test assessment out.
entitlements.inherit.plist keys
<key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit</key> <true/>
<key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory</key> <true/>
entitlements.plist keys:
<key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit</key> <true/>
<key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory</key> <true/>
<key>com.apple.developer.automatic-assessment-configuration</key> <true/>
I'm honestly not sure whether the keychain is expected, but I have tried a lot of entitlement combinations to get rid of It. Electron builder is doing the signing, and we manually use the notary tool to notarize but probably irrelevant.
mac: {
notarize: false,
target: 'dir',
entitlements: 'buildResources/entitlements.mac.plist',
provisioningProfile: 'buildResources/xyu.provisionprofile',
entitlementsInherit: 'buildResources/entitlements.mac.inherit.plist',
Any lead is welcome!
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Tags:
Automatic Assessment Configuration
Assessment
Security
Entitlements